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Toronto Raptors Underrated Contenders in the 2026 NBA Season

Explore why the Toronto Raptors are underrated contenders, focusing on defense, Kawhi Leonard's impact, and roster changes in 2026.

Toronto Raptors Underrated Contenders in the 2026 NBA Season

The shift is real, but it is mostly about roster construction

Toronto has moved from interesting young defensive team to plausible Eastern Conference problem. That is the shift. It does not mean the Raptors are proven title favorites, and the evidence does not support treating them as one.

Still, several outlets have independently arrived at the same broad premise. SB Nation framed Toronto as the league’s overlooked contender, Sports Illustrated positioned the offseason as a solution to the club’s primary problem, and Yahoo Sports assessed the Raptors’ moves as a meaningful sequence rather than isolated transactions. [13][14]

Those are not identical arguments, but they are responding to the same roster change. Toronto did not merely add name recognition. It exchanged an awkward high-usage fit for a player whose half-court value is easier to place beside Scottie Barnes.

The trend matters because contender conversations usually begin with last season’s standings, star power, or championship odds. Toronto’s case is more structural. Its defense was already carrying playoff-level habits, while the offseason targeted the offensive possessions that had been harder to finish.

Start with the possession profile, not the trade headline

The Raptors finished 2025-26 with a 113.0 defensive rating, fifth in the NBA and third in the Eastern Conference behind Detroit and Boston. Their 115.9 offensive rating ranked 15th, producing a plus-2.9 net rating that placed 11th overall. [7][8]

That is not the statistical profile of a dominant team. It is the profile of a team whose defense is ready earlier than its offense. The Raptors were good enough to prevent efficient possessions, but not consistently strong enough to create them.

Defensive rating measures points allowed per 100 possessions, not simple points allowed per game. That distinction matters because pace can disguise whether a defense actually controls the quality of shots, transition opportunities, and second chances opponents create.

Toronto’s fifth-place finish suggests its identity was not theoretical. A team cannot accidentally defend that well across a full season. It generally requires reliable point-of-attack resistance, functional help behind the ball, and lineups that can avoid catastrophic matchup concessions.

The remaining issue was what happened when possessions slowed down. In playoff basketball, opponents can put extra attention on the primary creator, switch more selectively, shrink driving lanes, and force a team to generate a credible shot late in the clock.

Barnes can organize offense, but asking him to solve every possession also changes the geometry around him. Defenders can load toward his drives, dare limited shooters to make decisions, and turn his passing reads into a test of spacing rather than vision.

That is why the Leonard acquisition is more important than the headline suggests. Toronto needed another player who could begin a possession, finish one, or punish a defense for committing too many bodies to Barnes.

What Leonard changes, when he is available

The official trade brings 35-year-old Kawhi Leonard back to the franchise with which he won the 2019 championship. The Clippers received Brandon Ingram, Gradey Dick, unprotected 2031 and 2033 first-round picks, a 2027 first-round swap, and 2030 and 2033 second-round picks. [4]

Leonard averaged 27.9 points, 6.4 rebounds and 3.6 assists across 65 games last season. Those box-score numbers are useful as a baseline, but his more relevant value is the type of possessions he can stabilize. [7]

He gives Toronto a late-clock option who does not require a complicated advantage to begin working. A wing isolation, a post-up against a smaller defender, or a simple two-man action can create a shot without placing every decision on Barnes.

That changes coverage choices. If an opponent switches a Barnes screen to prevent downhill pressure, Leonard can attack the resulting mismatch. If it sends an extra defender at Leonard, Barnes has room to operate as the next decision-maker rather than the initial one.

The best version of this partnership is not Leonard taking every important touch. It is Toronto using Leonard’s individual scoring gravity to make Barnes’ reads cleaner, Immanuel Quickley’s pull-up shooting more available, and RJ Barrett’s driving lanes less crowded.

There is also a defensive argument. Toronto does not need Leonard to reprise his peak workload as a roaming stopper. It needs another large wing who can handle difficult assignments without forcing Barnes to absorb every physically demanding matchup.

That matters against Eastern Conference lineups built around oversized scorers and multiple ballhandlers. A defense becomes easier to scheme when it can assign matchups without exposing a small guard, overhelping from the corners, or placing its best defender in constant foul trouble.

The Ingram question is fit, not blame

The trade should not be reduced to a verdict on Brandon Ingram. Ingram is a talented scorer, and moving him removes a player capable of carrying possessions. The question is whether his usage was producing the cleanest version of Toronto’s offense.

SB Nation’s analysis pointed to a key on-off concern: the Raptors were better with Barnes playing alone than with Barnes and Ingram sharing the floor. That does not prove either player was the problem. It suggests the pairing did not automatically create additive offense.

Two high-usage creators can coexist, but only if the possessions between their touches remain valuable. That means purposeful screening, quick secondary decisions, dependable shooting, and enough defensive versatility that the lineup does not trade one end of the floor for the other.

Leonard’s theoretical fit is cleaner because he can be the possession finisher without needing to dominate the setup. He can also operate from the wing, mid-post, or as a screener, though there is no reported evidence yet detailing Darko Rajakovic’s planned scheme.

That absence matters. It would be easy to assume Toronto will copy its 2019 offense because Leonard has returned. The current roster is different, Barnes is not Pascal Siakam, and the available reporting does not establish how Leonard’s minutes or role will be managed.

Why the supporting moves matter

Toronto’s offseason was not solely the Leonard transaction. The Raptors also selected Allen Graves with the 19th pick and added veteran forward Kyle Anderson, two moves that have received positive attention for fit rather than star power. [11][13]

Graves’ significance is straightforward. If a rookie can defend his position, move the ball, and avoid becoming a target, he helps preserve the lineup flexibility that made Toronto’s defense valuable. Asking more than that immediately would be projection.

Anderson’s value is more situational. A veteran connector can organize second units, make the extra pass, and cover for a possession where the first action fails. Those skills matter most when a contender tries to survive non-star minutes.

Jakob Poeltl remains central to the whole equation. Toronto’s defensive floor depends on having a legitimate interior presence behind its perimeter activity, while his screening gives Quickley, Barnes, and Leonard a way to generate an advantage before isolation becomes necessary.

The deeper roster construction point is that Toronto did not trade its defensive infrastructure for offense. That is the contrast underlying the optimism. A team can improve scoring through a transaction and still become easier to attack, which often proves costly in postseason series.

The risk case is not a footnote

Leonard’s availability is the obvious qualifier, and it is substantial. He played 65 games last season, but he has appeared in only 56 percent of possible games over the previous nine seasons, according to the research surrounding the transaction. [7][9]

A 65-game season is encouraging, not a guarantee. Toronto must plan as if it will need to win meaningful stretches without him, which makes Barnes’ development, Quickley’s shot creation, Barrett’s efficiency, and the bench’s organization more than supporting details.

Leonard is also entering the final year of a contract paying $50.3 million. His age, medical history, and the expected extension discussions make this a short-window decision as much as a basketball fit decision. [9][10]

There is a chemistry question, too. Toronto’s defense was built around a particular rhythm of effort, switching decisions, help responsibilities, and ball movement after stops. Integrating a veteran scorer can improve late-game offense while still disrupting those habits early.

No reporting supplied a detailed Rajakovic minute plan, a Leonard workload plan, or direct accounts of how teammates expect touches to be distributed. That means confident forecasts about immediate chemistry are speculation, not analysis.

The trade’s unusual backdrop adds another layer. The Clippers accepted a $30 million fine, forfeited five first-round picks, and saw owner Steve Ballmer suspended for one year in connection with salary-cap violations involving Leonard. [1][5][6]

That context helps explain why a franchise-changing player became available, but it does not lower Toronto’s basketball risk. The Raptors still surrendered a major collection of future assets and need Leonard to provide more than a symbolic reunion.

Why the public may still be behind the curve

Toronto is easy to overlook because last year’s offense was middle-of-the-pack and because the Eastern Conference has more familiar contenders. The Knicks, Celtics, Cavaliers, 76ers, Pistons and others offer clearer recent narratives, even where their rosters contain real questions.

Betting markets would normally offer one shorthand for that skepticism, but they should not be used here. FanDuel’s available Raptors information has not established current 2026-27 conference or championship odds, while June numbers are no longer a reliable market signal. [3]

Fan reaction is not unanimously bullish, either. FanVerdicts assigned Toronto’s offseason an F grade, reflecting concern about roster gaps, asset cost, Leonard’s health, and the uncertainty of turning a collection of good moves into a coherent contender. [11]

That skepticism is healthy. The Raptors have not demonstrated a top-five offense, and no trade announcement can prove that they will. What Toronto has done is give itself a more believable method for closing the offensive gap.

What Toronto’s blueprint means for a team-building project

For a front office planning its own contender project, Toronto offers a useful sequencing lesson. First establish an identity that survives lineup variation. Then spend aggressively on the specific possessions that kept the team from advancing, rather than chasing generic talent accumulation.

The Raptors identified a defense that ranked fifth, not a roster that needed demolition. Their move was designed to improve half-court creation while preserving size, matchup versatility, and enough veteran steadiness to keep the defensive standard intact. [7][8]

The caution is equally important. A future first-round pick is not merely a transaction chip when it is unprotected. Toronto’s 2031 and 2033 firsts, plus the 2027 swap, mean the Leonard wager reaches far beyond one season. [4]

That is the threshold for calling the Raptors underrated rather than overrated. Their roster now contains a credible playoff answer to an offensive weakness, but credibility is not proof. The defense must remain elite, Leonard must be available, and the new hierarchy must produce cleaner possessions.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why are the Toronto Raptors considered underrated contenders?

The Raptors are seen as underrated contenders because they have a strong defensive foundation, finishing fifth in defensive rating last season, and have made roster moves that address their primary offensive weaknesses. Their defense is playoff-ready, and the offseason additions improve their ability to finish offensive possessions, making them a plausible Eastern Conference problem despite not being dominant favorites.

How does Kawhi Leonard improve the Raptors' chances?

Kawhi Leonard raises Toronto’s offensive ceiling by providing a reliable late-clock scoring option who can create shots without relying solely on Scottie Barnes. His ability to attack mismatches and stabilize possessions helps diversify the offense, which was previously too dependent on Barnes. However, his impact depends on his health and availability, as he has a history of limited games played.

What makes the Raptors' defense strong in 2026?

The Raptors’ defense is strong due to reliable point-of-attack resistance, effective help defense, and lineups that avoid bad matchup concessions. Their fifth-place defensive rating reflects consistent control over shot quality, transition opportunities, and second chances allowed. This defensive identity was established over a full season, indicating it is a structural strength rather than a fluke.

What roster changes have made the Raptors a contender?

The Raptors traded Brandon Ingram, Gradey Dick, and multiple future draft picks to acquire Kawhi Leonard, a proven wing scorer and playoff performer. They also drafted Allen Graves and signed veteran Kyle Anderson, adding versatility and basketball IQ. These moves upgraded their offense while maintaining their top-tier defensive structure, addressing previous offensive limitations.

How does Toronto's offense compare to its defense?

Toronto’s offense ranked 15th in the league with a 115.9 offensive rating, while its defense was much stronger, ranking fifth with a 113.0 defensive rating. This contrast shows the team’s defense is playoff-ready, but their offense was middle-tier and needed improvement. The acquisition of Leonard aims to elevate the offense closer to the level of their defense.

How we researched this

This article was assembled from 5 published articles, 14 cited references.

Nothing here is based on hands-on testing. Where a figure or finding appears, it belongs to the source cited beside it, and the writing says so rather than implying otherwise. Every source is listed below so you can check it.

Sources